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COMITY
courts a greater degree of latitude than the rather
limited provisions of the statute provide.
Although Younger and its companions constitute
a fairly complete statement of the Court's views on
the equitable powers of federal courts in the area of
state criminal proceedings, several questions re-
main to be answered before the picture is com-
pleted: the question of exhaustion of state remedies,
the time sequence of federal intervention and the
danger of irreparable injury, the extent to which
federal courts may intervene in criminal law
administration which does not involve pending
proceedings, the exact requisites of standing to
challenge a statute as unconstitutionally broad,
and the related question of the point at which
"state proceedings" begin.71 But whatever the
7 Although the Court in Younger and Boyle dis-
missed plaintiffs for lack of controversy, it announced
no guidelines to determine when a petitioner was suffi-
future of federal injunctive relief may be, Younger
and its companions promise to be significant
precedents for many years to corne.
ciently threatened with prosecution to have standing to
challenge a statute and yet not in the position of having
had "state proceedings" commenced against him so as
to preclude relief under Younger. At some time the
Court may be called upon to decide the point at which
criminal proceedings have begun within the terms of
Younger. Possible points of beginning could be: is-
suance of an arrest warrant, actual custody, convening
of a grand jury, or return of an indictment. But see
Hartsville Theatres Inc., v. Fox, 324 F. Supp. 258
(D.S.C. 1971), decided the same day as Younger (Feb.
23, 1971) where the court decided that for purposes of
the anti-injunction statute (see note 13, supra for text)
criminal proceedings begin with an arrest. Id. at 262.
There also exists within the Younger decision the
possibility of an unseemly race to the courthouse: state
officials rushing to commence state proceedings to pre-
clude federal intervention, while the prospective de-
fendant rushes to the federal court to invoke that
court's equitable powers.
CONFRONTATION
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)
In Dutton v. Evans' the Supreme Court upheld
a state statutory exception to the hearsay rule2
against the claim that it contravened the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause.3 In reaching
its decision the Court substantially reformulated
the standard under which the confrontation clause
is applied.
In Dutton, defendant Evans and two others,
Williams and Truett, were charged with the murder
of three police officers. Evans and Williams were
indicted and tried separately; Truett, however,
was granted immunity from prosecution in return
for his testimony. Evans was convicted by a jury,
and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. 4 The
federal district court denied a writ of habeas
corpus; but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Evans had been
denied the right to confront a witness against him.'
'400 U. S. 74 (1970).
'After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the
declarations by any one of the conspirators during
the pendency of the criminal project shall be ad-
missible against all.
GA. CoDE AN. § 38-306 (1954).
3 The sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides in part: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the defendant shall enjoy the right...
of confronting the witnesses against him."
4 Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
5 Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 831-32 (5th Cir.
1968).
Evans alleged that the trial court erred by
admitting hearsay testimony by Shaw who at trial
related a statement purportedly made to him by
Williams while both were incarcerated for unre-
lated crimes. According to Shaw, Williams re-
sponded to an inquiry about the outcome of
William's arraignment by remarking, "If it hadn't
been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be'in this now." Shaw's report of this
statement was admitted at Evans' trial under a
statutory exception 6 to the hearsay rule, resembling
the common law co-conspirator exception. Evans
contended that the application of the Georgia
exception to Shaw's testimony violated his sixth
amendment right to confront the real witness
against him-Williams, declarant of the incrimi-
nating statement.
At common law statements by one co-con-
spirator were admissible against another despite
the hearsay rule, provided that the statements
were made during the conspiracy.7 In Georgia,
6 See note 2 supra.
7 If two persons are engaged in a conspiracy, the
statements of one may be used against the other not-
withstanding the witness's availability or the failure
to have him cross-examined. The test of trustworthiness
is that "What one of the conspirators admits while
the plot is afoot about the plan... is said by one who
has special knowledge and generally is against the
[Vol. 62
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however, the comparable statutory hearsay excep-
tion was construed. to include, in addition, state-
ments made after the conspiracy had terminated
and during the period when the conspirators were
concealing their guilt 8 Thus in Dutton, Williams'
statement was admissible against the defendant
because it was made during the concealment
phase.
The defendant argued that because the Georgia
exception, as applied in Dullon, exceeded the
scope of the comparable federal, 9 or common law,
co-conspirator exception, it violated the sixth
amendment confrontation requirement. The argu-
ment relied on Supreme Court decisions in which
the Court expressed the confrontation require-
ment in terms of the hearsay rule and its tradi-
tional exceptions.10 Defining it in these terms, the
defendant argued, restricted exceptions to the
confrontation requirement to traditional hearsay
exceptions.
Dean Wigmore contended that the confrontation
clause was merely a general endorsement of the
hearsay principle by the framers of the Constitu-
tion.n In his view the opportunity to cross-examine
adverse witnesses was the raison d'elre of both doc-
trines. Confrontation,12 or the opportunity to
declarant's interest." McCoxsncx, EVmENCE § 244,
at 522 (2d ed. 1954).
8 See, e.g., Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d
240 (1966); Chatterton v. State, 221 Ga. 424, 144
S.E.2d 726, cerl. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1965); Burns
v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 11 S.E.2d 350 (1940). Compare
Chatlerlon with Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S.
604, 617 (1953) (federal co-conspirator rule). See also
Note, Evidence-Co-conspiratr Ride, 20 BtrUFALO L.
RxEv. 721 (1971).
9 FED. R. C=. P. 26 provides:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise pro-
vided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The
admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except
when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise
provide, by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.10See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542,
548 (1926) where the Supreme Court said:
The right of confrontation did not originate with
the sixth amendment, but was a common law right
having recognized exceptions. The purpose of
thatp-rovision, this Court often has said, is to con-
tinue and preserve that right, and not to broaden
it or disturb the exceptions.
See also text accompanying notes 14-16 infra.
115 WIGMOE, EvEDENcE § 1397, at 130-31 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as NVIGMoRE].12 The right to confrontation is basically a trial
right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-
examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of the witness.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
cross-examine, was always forcefully expressed at
common law. It was the defendant's right to be
"brought face to face" with adverse witnesses. But,
argued Wigmore, "the right to subject opposing
testimony to cross-examination is the right to have
the Hearsay rule enforced." Thus for Wigmore the
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause were
simply different expressions of the same principle.
In his view, however, the confrontation clause did
not write into the Constitution common law hear-
say exceptions but rather the underlying princi-
ples. He concluded, therefore, that the confronta-
tion requirement was not inconsistent with the
progressive liberalization of hearsay exceptions.1 3
Early decisions14 by the Supreme Court agreed
that the confrontation requirement was not abso-
lute and declared that common law exceptions to
it would not be disturbed. In Maltox v. United
States,15 the Court upheld the admission of a de-
ceased's prior recorded testimony at the defend-
ant's trial because of the "necessities of the case,
and to prevent a manifest failure of justice."
Though the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a traditional hearsay exception, it did not specifi-
cally refer to it as a hearsay exception but rather
as an exception to the confrontation requirement
"recognized long before the adoption of the Con-
stitution." 16
Recent decisions, consistent with Mallox, have
approached the confrontation clause as requiring
an evaluation of whether necessity and an ade-
quate opportunity to cross-examine were present
at the admission of the hearsay testimony.17 In
1 The revision and extension of [the hearsay]
exceptions is gradually progressing, and it is well
to appreciate fully that there is in this progress
nothing inconsistent with constitutional sanc-
tions. So bold are nowadays the attempts to
wrest the Constitution in aid of crime, and so
complaisant are some Courts in listening to
fantastic and unfounded objections to evidence,
that the permissibility of such changes should
not be left in the slightest doubt.
5 WiGuoRE § 1397, at 135.14See note 10 supra and Snyder v. Massachu-
setts 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1895); Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 151 (1892). In Snyder Mr. Justice Cardozo
stated:
Nor has the privilege of confrontation.at any time
been without recognized exceptions, as for instance
dying declarations or documentary evidence.
291 U.S. at 107.
Is 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
16 Id. at 243.
17 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970);
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380
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Pointer v. Texas,us applying the confrontation
clause to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court refused to admit testimony re-
corded at a preliminary hearing where the defend-
ant, lacking counsel, did not have an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine. The Court held this
denial to be a deprivation of defendant's confron-
tation right. Similarly, in Barber v. Page9 the
Court ruled previously recorded testimony inad-
missible where the prosecution had not made a
good faith effort to secure the presence of the
originator in court. In Barber the originator of the
testimony was incarcerated in a federal prison in
another jurisdiction. According to the traditional
hearsay exception, unavailability was satisfied
where the witness was beyond the court's power
to compel attendance. 0 But the Supreme Court
ruled that this availability test was outmoded by
the increasing cooperation between the federal
government and the states.21 The Court held that
the confrontation clause required the prosecution
to explore new avenues of federal-state coopera-
tion to make the witness available for trial.
Relying on these decisions, the fifth circuit in
Evans v. Dutton" stated:
The Supreme Court has now made dear that
the rationale of hearsay exceptions in criminal
cases must be continually scrutinized and re-
evaluated.... We therefore think it clear that,
if an accused is to be deprived of the right to con-
front and to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, there must be salient and cogent
reasons for the deprivation.'
The court concluded that the justifications for the
Georgia co-conspirator exception did not satisfy
the confrontation clause.
Reversing, the Supreme Court asserted that the
fifth circuit's approach, seeking "salient and cogent
reasons," was unsound.24 The Court was disturbed
U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415(1965). See also Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1963);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).18380 U.S. 400 (1965).
19 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
2 'Id. at 723.
21 Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in
Barber, noted that "[tlhe right of confrontation may
not be dispensed with so easily." 390 U.S. at 724. He
suggested that under 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(5) the federal
courts had power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad
testificandum at the request of state prosecution author-
ities, in order to provide the state with a federally
incarcerated witness.
Id. at 723 and n. 4.
22 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 830.
24400 U.S. at 80.
that this approach, essentially equating the hear-
say rule with the confrontation clause, would "re-
quire a constitutional reassessment of every es-
tablished hearsay exception, federal or state .... ", 2
The Court conceded that the confrontation clause
and the hearsay rule "stem from the same roots," 26
but it declined to equate the two. The Court's
alternative, however, carefully avoided clarifying
the relationship between the hearsay rule and the
sixth amendement. "We confine ourselves, instead,
to deciding the case before us." 27
The Court first dismissed the defendant's con-
tention that the Georgia hearsay exception violated
the confrontation clause because its application in
Dutton exceeded the scope of the comparable
federal, or common law, co-conspirator exception.
25 Id.
28400 U.S. at 86. This position was initially asserted
by the Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149(1970), where the Court upheld a recently enacted
California hearsay exception which permitted the
introduction of prior inconsistent statements for the
truth of the statements as well as for impeachment
purposes. CA.. Evm. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). Cali-
fornia's rule represented a minority position. But the
Court explained:
Our task in this case is not to decide which of
these positions, purely as a matter of the law of
evidence, is the sounder.... While it may be readily
conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that
the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation
Clause is nothing more or less than a codification
of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law.... [m]erely
because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-
established hearsay rule does not lead to the auto-
matic conclusion that confrontation rights have
been denied.
399 U.S. at 155-56. The Green Court held that the con-
frontation clause was satisfied because the declarant of
the statement was cross-examined when the statement
was made at a preliminary hearing, and because he
was again cross-examined about the statement at trial
though he claimed no recollection of making it or of
the facts it asserted. But see People v. Johnson, 68
Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969) upon which the
California appellate court relied in holding § 1235
unconstitutional in Green.
Green differs from the earlier decisions set forth in
note 17 supra in upholding, rather than invalidating,
the admission of evidence pursuant to a hearsay ex-
ception. Green, however, is consistent with these earlier
decisions insofar as it reached its decision upon prin-
ciples of cross-examination and availability. In Dutton,
the Court reaffirmed its position in Green that the
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause were not
equivalent, but it departed from its previous confron-
tation standard by using traditional hearsay exception
tests of a statement's trustworthiness to uphold the
admission of hearsay involved in Dutton. See 400 U.S.




Speaking ior the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart de-
nied that the federal rule of evidence defined the
parameters of the confrontation requirement. He
clarified that the limited contoursn- of the federal
co-conspirator exception "have simply been de-
fined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-mak-
ing power in the area of the federal law of evi-
dence." 2_ Thus the Court assured that state evi-
dentiary rules would not per se violate the sixth
amendment for failing to coincide with the federal
or traditional hearsay exceptions.
The Court then. considered whether the admis-
sion of Shaw's hearsay testimony violated the
confrontation standard. Contending that it did, the
defendant relied on a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions finding confrontation violations.30
In each of these decisions the Court had found
either an inadequate opportunity to cross-examine
or an untapped availability of the witness to tes-
tify. The declarant in Dutton was not cross-ex-
amined about his incriminating statement when
it was made or at defendant's trial, nor was he
deceased or unavailable;3 yet the Dutton Court
maintained that none of its recent decisions was
directly applicable to Dulon.3
The Court held that the Georgia exception in
Dutton did not, as applied, violate defendant's
right to confrontation. Though the insignificance
of the disputed testimony's influence at trial was
persuasive in this decision,13 the Court grounded its
holding upon the. circumstantial reliability of the
declarant's statement. Thus, though confrontation
and the hearsay rule were not to be equated,
Shaw's testimony was held to satisfy the confron-
tation requirement because the declarant "had
no apparent reason to lie," "his statement was
spontaneous," and was made "against his penal
21It is clear that the limited scope of the hearsay
exception in federal conspiracy trials is a product,
not of the Sixth Amendment, but of the Court's
"disfavor" of "attempts to broaden the already
pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy
prosecutions." (citation omitted)
400 U.S. at 82.2) d.3  See note 17 supra., exclusive of California v. Green.
"See 400 U.S. at 102 (dissenting opinion of Justice
Marshall).
2 Id. at 87.
"Shaw was only one of twenty witnesses testifying
for the prosecution, and by far the most damaging
testimony was given by an actual eyewitness report of
the triple murder. The Court found Shaw's testimony
to be of "peripheral significance at most." Id. at 87.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion is devoted
entirely to a discussion of harmless error, and he
doubted whether any jury could believe Shaw's tes-
timony. Id. at 90. The Chief Justice joined his opinion.
interest" 'L-textbook tests for the reliability of
hearsay.
justice Marshall, dissenting, reasserted the
primacy of cross-examination in the confrontation
requirement. For him Douglas v. Alabama was
controlling. In Douglas a confession by an alleged
accomplice implicating the defendant was intro-
duced at the defendant's trial. Although the ac-
complice was called to testify, he invoked the
fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The Court held the implicating
statement inadmissible as violating defendant's
confrontation right. The Court found that the
accomplice's 'refusal to testify defeated defend-
ant's right to cross-examine and to test the state-
ment's truth. Similarly in Dutton, argued justice
Marshall, the defendant was deprived of his right
to cross-examine the declarant Williams. Accord-
ing to Marshall, Williams was not only available,
but no attempt had been made to call him to
testify.3 6
Justice Marshall also criticized the Court's re-
formulation of the confrontation standard:
I am troubled by the fact that the plurality
for reversal, unable when ll is said to place this
case beyond the principled reach of our prior de-
cisions, shifts its ground and begins a hunt for
whatever "indicia of reliability" may cling to
Williams' remark, as told by Shaw."
He questioned whether the confrontation clause
had any "vitality" independent of the hearsay
rule if the Court so readily found indicia of trust-
worthiness."
Justice Harlan, concurring, was not concerned
about the confrontation clause's vitality. Shifting
from his opinion last term in Green v. California,9
he has "since become convinced' that Dean Wig-
more was correct in linking the confrontation clause
with the principles of the hearsay rule. But he
warned, "however natural the shift may be, once
it is made it carries the seeds of great mischief for
enlightened development in the law of evidence."
Harlan conceived the confrontation clause as
34 Id. at 89.
- 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
z400 U.S. at 102.,
3Id. at 109. See note 26 supra.
381 believe the Confrontation Clause has been
sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an
indicium of a probative likelihood can come in,
no matter how damaging the statement may
be or how great the need for the truth-discovering
test of cross-examination.
Id. at 110, dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall.$9 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970). In Green, justice Harlan
